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Abstract
I take issue in this talk with AI formalizations of context, pri-
marily the formalization by McCarthy and Buvacˇ, that regard
context as an undefined primitive whose formalization can be
the same in many different kinds of AI tasks. In particular, any
theory of context in natural language must take the special na-
ture of natural language into account and cannot regard context
simply as an undefined primitive. I show that there is no such
thing as a coherent theory of context simpliciter—context pure
and simple—and that context in natural language is not the
same kind of thing as context in KR. In natural language, con-
text is constructed by the speaker and the interpreter, and both
have considerable discretion in so doing. Therefore, a formal-
ization based on pre-defined contexts and pre-defined ‘lifting
axioms’ cannot account for how context is used in real-world
language.
1 Introduction
I’d like to start with a generalization that I’ve made over the last few years:
The solution to any problem in AI may be found in the writings
of Wittgenstein, though the details of the implementation are
sometimes rather sketchy.
Now, I’m not a scholar of Wittgenstein—in fact, the more I learn about
him, the less I feel I understand him—and I’m hardly going to mention
him in this talk. Nonetheless, he’s going to be there in the background
throughout the talk. He’d have been a great choice as an opening speaker
for a symposium on context in KR and NL.
My purpose in this talk will be to show that there is no such thing as a
coherent theory of context simpliciter—context pure and simple; that con-
text in natural language is not the same kind of thing as context in KR; and
that any theory of context in natural language must take the special nature
of natural language into account and cannot regard context simply as an
undefined primitive.
Before I proceed, I’d like to draw attention to the cogent paper by Varol
Akman, “Context as a social construct”, which he’ll be presenting later to-
day. Akman says many things in his paper that I wish I’d thought to say.
(I don’t mean to imply, however, that I agree with everything that Akman
says, let alone that he agrees with everything that I’m going to say in this
talk).
2 Context is as context does
I want to begin with what might seem to be a completely different topic—
stressors. Its relevance will become clear in due course.
Hans Selye (1950) coined the word stressor to refer to anything that
causes stress—a deviation or distortion of a system from its normal state.1
Selye was mostly concernedwith physiological responses to biogenic stres-
sors, but much of the subsequent research concentrated on psychological
stressors. Whether some thing or some event is a psychological stressor de-
pends entirely on how it is interpreted by the person experiencing it. From
one book on the topic:
1Selye’s intent was to disambiguate the word stress, which, in casual usage, can refer
both to a cause and to its effect; Selye reserved it for the latter and introduced the newword
for the former (Selye 1950: 9).
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A stimulus becomes a stressor by virtue of the fact that it has,
indeed, engendered a stress response. . . . Psychosocial stressors
become stressors by virtue of the cognitive interpretation, or
meaning, assigned to the stressor. . . . For example, a traffic jam
is a neutral event; it only becomes a stressor by virtue of the fact
that the driver interprets the traffic jam as a threatening or oth-
erwise undesirable situation. If the driver would interpret the
traffic jam as having some positive or desirable aspect to it, no
stress response is likely to evolve. (Everly 1989: 6–7)
Consequently, psychological stressors can be almost anything from signifi-
cant life events such as marriage and bereavement to a headache, a bad day
at the office, a loud noise, sex or lack of sex, the number 4, the number 666
(cf Noshpitz and Coddington 1990). And the concept of ‘stressor’ now has
even wider currency; ecologists, for example, will speak of the stressors of
an ecosystem:
This study identifies . . . ecological stressors to boreal lakes . . .
The primary stressors are alterations in lake levels due to dam
construction and removal; nutrient loading from the town site
and marina; the sports fisheries; and contaminant loading from
local . . . and long-range . . . atmospheric sources. (Evans 1997)
Thus, stressors are defined solely in terms of their effects—in fact, in terms
of their effects on any particular person or system. What acts as a stressor
for one person or system might have no effect at all on someone or some-
thing else. Just about anything can, in principle, be a stressor of something
else.
What this means is that we cannot have any theory of the concept of
‘stressor’ simpliciter. There is no procedure by which we can determine
whether or not a particular entity is a stressor just by looking at its prop-
erties or attributes. All we can do is actually apply the putative stressor to
possible victims, and see if at least one of them experiences stress. Cer-
tainly, we can talk of ‘frequent stressors’ or ‘likely stressors’ of various
kinds of stressees, and we can have theories of what kinds of objects these
are and recognition procedures for them. But it’s only when we particular-
ize in just this way that we can have such theories and procedures.
In other words, ‘stressor’ is not a natural kind. And neither is ‘context’.
Like ‘stressor’, ‘context’ is a concept that is defined solely in terms of effects
in a given situation.
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Just about anything can, in principle, be a context. Whether something
actually is a context can be determined only by its effect (which I’ll describe
a little while later). And what is a context in one particular case might not
be a context in another case. What this means is that we can’t have any
theory of the nature of a context. There is no procedure by which we can
determine whether or not a particular entity is a context just from looking
at its properties or attributes. All we can do is apply the putative context
to possible victims, and see if at least one of them experiences a contextual
effect.
Consequently, any approach to ‘context’ simpliciter that tries to or pur-
ports to reify it, formalize it, or just speak of different views of it is inher-
ently misguided.
McCarthy and Buvacˇ (1997), for example, explicitly decline to give any
definition of ‘context’—it’s as undefined as an element of a group, says Mc-
Carthy in another paper (1996). But then they proceed to stipulate—despite
the lack of definition—that contexts can be formalized as first-class objects,
all of the same formal type, that they’re things that propositions can be true
in, and that they’re things that can be entered and exited and nested. Mc-
Carthy and Buvacˇ seem to see contexts as containers of some kind, at least
metaphorically speaking. But that’s just an assumption that theymake, and
it’s an assumption that they make so deeply that they never even refer to it
explicitly. My point in this talk is that ‘context’ simply doesn’t permit this
kind of approach.
Now, understand here that I am not opposing the general enterprise
of formalizing abstracta. On the contrary, it’s an enterprise that I engage
in myself—for example in Hirst 1995, I wrote of “differences as first-class
objects”. Rather, I am suggesting that formalization, when appropriate,
should be just about the final step, rather than the first step, in the un-
derstanding of a putative concept. And in the case of ‘context’, it’s clear
that we are still in a very early stage of understanding.
McCarthy (1996) suggests that a mathematical logic of contexts would
be analogous to the mathematical theory of groups. But he himself points
out that group theory arose from observations that the algebraic properties
of integers under addition were the same as those of the rationals under
multiplication, and the appropriate abstractions could then be made. In the
case of context, however, we don’t even have the observations yet. Sure, we
can devise a nice new formal logic, and even call it a logic of context rather
than, say, a logic of snibs or snecks or some gensymedword. But if the logic
is to have something to say about what the English word context is about,
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then a little more work is in order. In his section entitled “Desiderata for a
mathematical logic of context”, even though he explicitly mentions applica-
tions in natural language, McCarthy lists nothing more than a few matters
of formalization, and despite the heading, no desiderata deriving from the
rather obvious need that a logic of context account for what context does
in natural language, nor even the desideratum of finding out what such
desiderata might be.
Evenwhile side-stepping any definition of ‘context’, McCarthy and Buvacˇ
(1997), do say that contexts are “rich” objects. Yet they never open them up
and look at their internal structure, preferring instead to follow a path anal-
ogous to the development of group theory, though they do seem to want
their work to be genuinely useful in AI applications. This is all a bit like
saying that a course on the algebra of groups, rings, and fields is the only
qualification that anyone needs in order to become a professional accoun-
tant or bookkeeper.
So what we need to do is think a little bit about what a context is and
what it does. (That’s why I like Varol Akman’s paper. Akman wants to
formalize context too, and he does so in conjunction with careful thinking
about what context is.)
3 Informal notions of context
One of the purposes of a symposium such as this one is to explore pre-
theoretical notions of context. While many researchers in AI talk about
“context”, or use representations that implicitly or explicitly act as “con-
text” in some sense, the notion of context is still pre-theoretical. And this
symposium (and, even more so, its predecessor at IJCAI-95) was conceived
by Łucja Iwan´ska and others in recognition of that.
As academic researchers, our natural response to the announcement of
a meeting like this is to give a paper with a short preamble on “Here’s what
context means to me, and hence should mean to everyone”, and then, as if
this were all beyond dispute, immediately proceed with a formalization,
representation, or algorithm. Or even to dispense with the preamble, as if
one’s own view were just presumed to be accepted universally.
But here, I’d like to take things a little more slowly, and cover what
is often just the preamble. For one thing, even to speak of “pre-theoretical
notions of context” implies that a theory of context simpliciterwill eventuate
in due course, and, as I’ve just said, I don’t think that there can be any
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such thing. So I’d like to speak of “informal”, rather than “pre-theoretical”,
notions of context, and then restrict the discussion in such a way as tomake
theorizing and formalization possible.
To do this, I’ll start by pointing to the name of the symposium itself: It’s
not Context in AI, nor Context in Computer Vision, nor Context in Swedish Pol-
itics, 1894–1902, nor is it just plain Context. Rather, it’s Context in Knowledge
Representation and Natural Language.
Now, this is a very ambiguous name. First, both the terms knowledge
representation and natural language can denote objects of study, the enter-
prise of studying those objects, and, metonymously, both of these at once.
I think Łucja probably intended the metonymous reading. Second, and in
English can mean both intersection and union, and union additionally ad-
mits a distributive reading. So, loosely characterizing KR and NL as sets of
topics or concerns, there are three main interpretations possible:
1. Context in (KR ∩ NL)
2. Context in (KR ∪ NL)
3. (Context in KR) ∪ (Context in NL)
Notice that the third interpretation isn’t necessarily the same as the second.
It doesn’t go without saying that it’s meaningful to speak at all of a unified
notion of context in KR and NL, as in the second interpretation. Maybe
only the third reading is meaningful—that is, context in KR and context in
NL are two qualitatively different things, and the title of this symposium
is a kind of zeugma or pun. It’s like having a symposium named Stressors
of People and Boreal Lakes, and talking about what a bad day at the office
has in common with alterations in lake levels due to dam construction and
removal.
And, indeed, the word context really covers quite a board territory. In
their excellent survey article on the formalization of context, Akman and
Surav (1996) show that there are many different kinds and uses of context
even just within AI. Sure, there are similarities among these different kinds
of context—that’s why we use the same name for each—but it doesn’t fol-
low that everything we say about one kind will automatically be true of
another kind. One of our jobs at this symposium is to try to sort out the dif-
ferent meanings, and not just to presuppose that no such work is needed.
So what I’ll talk about next is why I think that context in KR and formal
reasoning is not the same as context in natural language. It will follow
from this that there can’t be any useful theory or formalization of context
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simpliciter, because the behaviour of each kind of context is different. As I
said before, all we have is the contextual effect.
But first, I need to make a distinction that I would have liked to have
fitted in a little earlier. I want to distinguish between ‘context’ and ‘element
of context’. When I spoke earlier of “the effects of a context”, what I really
wanted to say was “the effects of one or more elements of context”. But I
couldn’t actually say that earlier, because at that point I was still granting
the idea of ‘context’ as a primitive. But now that we realize that we need to
look at the internal structure of a context, we can talk about its individual
elements and about their effects, either singly or in concert.
4 Context in KR
Now, my research is primarily in natural language and computational lin-
guistics, and I don’t feel qualified to comment on or criticize proposals for
the formalization and use of context in formal knowledge representation
and reasoning. Rather, I’ll accept this research at face value, and then con-
trast it with what is required with regard to context in natural language, a
topic that I do feel qualified to talk about.
So I see no problem with the basic idea, from McCarthy (1987), of mak-
ing axioms context-dependent in order to be able to state them at the most
convenient or useful level of generality, nor with the suggestions as to the
advantages thatmight be gained from doing this that are set out by Shoham
(1991) and Akman and Surav (1996). McCarthy and Buvacˇ’s well-known
example in which different databases make different assumptions regard-
ing the price of airplane components shows the benefits of this approach.
But at the same time it shows the limitations. The example involves
formal, propositional reasoning, and the notion of a proposition being true
or false in a context. It assumes that the assumptionsmade by the databases
are static; and indeed, the exercise of writing any context-dependent axiom
assumes that the “home” context for the axiom is, in effect, pre-defined;
that contexts can be usefully related by generalization and specialization;
and that lifting axioms can be pre-defined to relate truth in one context to
truth in another. That’s fine in a formal system, but it doesn’t get us very
far with language, to which I’ll now turn.
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5 Context in natural language
When it comes to talking about context in natural language, there is over-
whelming consensus, I believe, on at least one point: context is a source
of information that can be used (is used, should be used, may be used,
must be used) by a language processor to reduce (or completely eliminate)
ambiguity, vagueness, or underspecification in its interpretations of the ut-
terances that it processes. That’s one of the effects of context. It constrains
interpretation.
And, in addition, context also affects both what the speaker intends to
say in the first place and how he or she goes about doing that. But there
are really two kinds of context in this—zeugma again. One is the situation
in which the speaker, as an agent, forms the intent to do something, which
in this case is to communicate some message. This context constrains the
agent’s intent. The other is the context that the speaker uses as a source
of information in creating that message, deciding exactly how it is to be
expressed to the particular hearer. This context constrains the form of the
communication and its exact content.
A point that immediately arises from this is that the use of context in
natural language communication is a psychological construct that is not di-
rectly concerned with truth, but rather with interpretation and belief, with
the generation of meaning. Propositional truth is involved only insofar as
the interpreter may use their beliefs about what is and isn’t true when they
form an interpretation of some utterance. In natural language, a context is
not something that propositions are “true in”. It’s something that interpre-
tations are formed in, or, more precisely, formedwith. An interpretation can
be more or less vague or ambiguous, and more or less in accord with the
speaker’s intent, and if the interpretation is a proposition—which it needn’t
be, of course—then it might indeed have a truth value—though it needn’t,
of course.
A second point that arises is that the speaker has considerable discre-
tion in the selection or construction of the context that is used in forming
the utterance. That is, the speaker can (under constraints that I’ll get to
shortly) choose which potential elements of context to attend to and use
andwhich ones to ignore. Likewise, the interpreter has considerable discre-
tion in the construction of the interpretation—and, notwithstanding any-
thing the speaker does, has discretion even in the selection or construction
of the context that is used to create the interpretation. That is, the inter-
preter can also choose which potential elements of context to attend to and
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interpret with and which ones to ignore. In an ideal, cooperative conversa-
tion, the speaker and hearer will harmonize their contexts (cf Regoczei and
Hirst 1990), negotiatingwhat they deem to be relevant; but they’re under no
special obligation to do so.
What I’d really like to do at this point is read you about twenty pages on
this topic fromDonald N. Levine’s fascinating bookThe flight from ambiguity
(1985). I don’t have time for that, so we’ll have to make do with a couple of
quotations and my attempts to summarize Levine’s discussion.
Levine’s main point is that an aversion to ambiguity in communica-
tion, and hence to the kind of discretionary interpretation that I’ve just
described, is a modern Western phenomenon, “unique” in world history
(p. 21). “Most if not all of the literate civilizations have considered the culti-
vation of ambiguous locution to be awonderful art”, Levine says (p. 21–22),
and goes on to give many examples. For instance:
‘The Somali language is sinuous’ [says David Laitin]. . . . Polit-
ical arguments and diplomatic messages take the form of allit-
erative poems, mastery of which is a key to prestige or power.
These poems typically begin with long, vague, circumlocutory
preludes, introducing the theme at hand, which is then couched
in allegory. . . . ‘A poetic message can be deliberately misinter-
preted by the receiver, without his appearing to be stupid. [The
receiver may] go into further allegory, circling round the issue
in other ways, to prevent direct confrontation.’ [Laitin 1977,
p. 39] (Levine 1985, p. 23–24)
This approach to communication reaches its zenith in Amharic. Levine
again:
One is considered a master of spoken Amharic only when one’s
speech is leavenedwith ambiguous nuances as amatter of course.
Even among the other people of Ethiopia, the Amhara have
been noted for extremes of symbolism and subtlety in their ev-
eryday talk. . . . Amharic conversation abounds with general,
evasive remarks, like . . . Set.agn! (‘Give me!’) [in which] the
speaker fails to specify what it is he wants. When the speaker
[is asked] about the object he desires, his response still may not
reveal what is really on his mind; and if it does, his interlocutor
will likely as not interpret that response as a disguise. (pp. 25–
26)
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Levine goes on to describe the various so-called “wax and gold” formulas
of Amharic poetry which have two levels of interpretation, a veneer and a
deeper meaning. The deeper meaning might depend upon symbolism or
allusion in the surface meaning. In the most difficult form, called “inside
the olive”, finding the esoteric meaning requires the interpreter to find a
completely different context. But this isn’t just a matter of poetry. Levine
writes:
The ambiguity symbolized by the formula ‘wax and gold’ col-
ors the entire fabric of Amhara life. It patterns the speech and
outlook of every Amhara. When he talks, his words carry dou-
ble entendre as a matter of course; when he listens, he is ever
on the lookout for latent meanings and hidden motives. As
an Ethiopian anthropologist once told me, wax and gold is far
more than a poetic formula; it is the Amhara ‘way of life’. (pp. 27–
28)
In other words, both the speaker and the interpreter have some discre-
tion in choosing and constructing the context in which the interpretation is
to be built. And while this discretion might be greater, and more explicitly
licensed, in Amharic or Somali than in English, it’s true in English too, even
if our politicians don’t routinely speak in alliterative allegorical poetry. We
see it every day in our ordinary conversations (Devlin and Rosenberg 1996,
p. 18), in advertising, political discourse, poetry, humor, allusion, persua-
sion and deception, negotiation of meaning, and misunderstanding and its
repair (Hirst, McRoy, Heeman, Edmonds, and Horton 1994).
Here’s a very simple example: In his first presidential campaign, Ross
Perot said
If the United States approves NAFTA, the giant sucking sound
that we hear will be the sound of thousands of jobs and factories
disappearing to Mexico.
Perot’s remark was widely reported, and was frequently alluded to by
other speakers. Three years later, the Reverend Jesse Jackson could write,
in an article on Martin Luther King’s “I have a dream” speech,
The ‘giant sucking sound’ is not merely American jobs going
to NAFTA and GATT cheap labor zones. The giant sucking
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sound is that as jobs and education diminish, our youth are be-
ing sucked into the jail industrial complex.2
Neither Perot nor NAFTA had been previously mentioned in the article,
but Jackson could allude to them anyway by this phrase, and make them
part of the context. A quick Web search easily finds hundreds of such al-
lusions to this one phrase. To fully understand the speaker’s intent, the
interpreter has to recognize the allusion and adjust the context of interpre-
tation accordingly.
But of course, having discretion in constructing context does not mean
having complete freedom. Obviously, considerable constraints arise from
the message that is to be communicated, the circumstances under which
the communication occurs, and the mechanisms of language itself. Even
in Somali, the interpreter has to take the utterance itself as a given. And
any language imposes rules as to how anaphora, for example, are to be in-
terpreted with respect to the preceding text, and so any preceding text is
necessarily an element of the context. Some aspects of the situation are also
obligatorily included. For example, Deborah Tannen (1990) has shown that
in American English, there are classes of sentences for which the gender of
the speaker determines pragmatic aspects of the intended univocal inter-
pretation, and it’s therefore an element of the context that the interpreter
ignores at his or her peril.
So what can actually be used as an element of context in natural lan-
guage? Many other people have already offered inventories or taxonomies
of the kinds of things that a speaker or interpreter must or may include
in a context, and so I don’t want to spend a lot of time here going into
details. I need only point out that it includes just about anything in the
circumstances of the utterance, and just about anything in the participants’
knowledge or prior or current experience (cf Empson 1953). So, Sperber
and Wilson (1986) have argued in detail that a speaker or listener can use
any fact or belief about the world that they have as an element of context.
Ferrari (1997), emphasizes the multimodal aspects of communication; he
divides elements of context into those of linguistic context, perceptual con-
text, intentional context, and encyclopedic knowledge, and he includes the
message itself, along with all the circumstances of its utterance, in what
he calls the “communicative situation”. Zarri (1995) distinguishes between
the a priori “internal / static” context and the “external / dynamic” con-
2“32 years later: The dream unfulfilled.” JaxFax, 3(34), 8 August 1995.
http://www.cais.com/pcedge/test/rb/fx50824.html
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text. The former includes knowledge of the language itself, such as the lex-
icon. Akman (1997) reiterates seven dimensions of context from the work
of Wendell Harris, and I’ll leave it to him to tell you about that later today.
Manfred Pinkal (1985) summarizes it all rather well:
Aside from the surrounding deictic coordinates, aside from the
immediate linguistic cotext and accompanying gestural expres-
sions at closer view, the following determinants can influence
the attribution of sense: the entire frame of interaction, the in-
dividual biographies of the participants, the physical environ-
ment, the social embedding, the cultural and historical back-
ground, and—in addition to all of these—facts and dates no
matter how far removed in time and space. Roughly speaking,
‘context’ can be
—I’d rather say “draw on”—
the whole world in relation to an utterance act. (Pinkal 1985,
p. 36)
So the discretion exercised by a speaker or an interpreter in constructing
a context is, in effect, a determination of what, among all this, is and isn’t
relevant to the utterance that is to be interpreted (Sperber and Wilson 1986).
But this leads us to a terminological difficulty. For something to even be
considered for possible relevance seems to imply that, regardless of the ac-
tual decision, that thing is an element of the context—otherwise, how could
it come to be considered? There are two intuitive notions of ‘context’ here.
The first, which I’ve tacitly been using up to this point, is the set of things
that are used to build the interpretation with (Sperber and Wilson 1986,
p. 15); and the other is that, plus the things that aren’t used but nonethe-
less had a potential to have been used. For example, you might say that
because the gender of the speaker is sometimes a factor in interpretation, it
is therefore always an element of context, even if the interpreter doesn’t al-
ways choose to use it. But then, by the same argument, you’d have to say
that Ross Perot’s giant sucking sound is always in the context because a
speaker can always make an utterance that alludes to it. And by a similar
argument, everything is in all contexts. But that’s not a very helpful view. A
middle ground, and one that I lean toward, is to say that context involves a
notion of attention to account for things that are at least considered for use
in constructing the utterance or interpretation; to decide that something is
not to be used in forming an interpretation is, in a sense, to use it in forming
that interpretation!
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We see then that context is both a psychological construct and, as Ak-
man says, a social construct, and it’s a social construct both in the sense that
it is a construct of society and in the sense that it is constructed socially—in
all our communication and social interactions—and constructed dynami-
cally. It’s not just a matter of moving axioms between pre-defined contexts
with pre-defined lifting axioms.
Given all this, research on context in natural language starts to look
quite familiar. In fact, much (or maybe most) research in natural language
in AI for the last 25 years and more can be seen simply as attempts to
characterize context (cf Sowa 1995). Roger Schank’s scripts (Schank and
Abelson 1977, Schank and Riesbeck 1981) and Gary Hendrix’s partitioned
semantic nets (1975) in the 1970s; my own marker passing in knowledge
bases in the 1980s (Hirst 1987); present-day statistical approaches based on
lexical co-occurrence; my own group’s recent use of lexical chains as “cheap”
context for tasks such as segmenting discourse, finding real-word spelling
errors, and automatically creating hypertext (Morris and Hirst 1991, Hirst
and St-Onge 1998, Green 1997)—these are all really just attempts to provide
or construct contexts with which utterances can be interpreted.
These approaches have had varying degrees of success. Some were
simply wrong—that is, they made observably false assumptions about the
nature of language. For example, Schank’s scripts assumed that situa-
tions always uniquely pre-determine the word meanings and inferences
that are applicable in the situation. McCarthy and Buvacˇ’s approach seems
to be, in effect, Schankian. Buvacˇ (1996), for example, chooses between two
homonymous meanings of the word bank in a logical form based on the
sentence Vanja is getting money at a bank by assuming that all other words
in the sentence are unambiguous and can be used to find the exact right
axiom in the commonsense context. As far as I can tell, the example re-
lies crucially on the assumption of univocality of the words get, money and
at, and if at were changed to from, the method would fail on the resulting
polysemy or metonymy.
Other AI approaches to interpretation in context were perhaps a lit-
tle more correct in principle, but still made unrealistic assumptions about
language or impractical assumptions about the knowledge sources upon
which they were supposed to draw; my own work on using semantic asso-
ciations in a knowledge base as a context for disambiguation should prob-
ably go in this category. Nonetheless, this approach at least had the merit
that interpretation was incremental, including the construction of context.
It did not assume that parsing, let alone the building of a logical form, can
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occur prior to any consideration of context or to processes of disambigua-
tion and interpretation.
So there’s a sense in which just about all research in AI on natural lan-
guage is research on context. And as we now see, it’s somewhat different
from context in KR.
There’s one obvious objection to making this distinction between con-
text in NL and context in knowledge representation and reasoning. Proper
interpretation of natural language, we’ve been told for many years, requires
knowledge representation and reasoning. So we’d better have a single the-
ory of context that covers them both.
I have two responses to this. First, despite Sperber and Wilson (1986),
it’s becoming clear that while the knowledge used in interpreting natural
language is broad, the reasoning is shallow. Although we can’t yet charac-
terize it precisely, it seems to be pretty much limited to reasoning about
quite simple commonsense knowledge, knowledge of kinds, of associa-
tions, of typical situations, and even typical utterances. We don’t do ar-
bitrary reasoning in interpretation. So we don’t need a very general theory.
Second, we probably do do arbitrary reasoning on arbitrary knowledge
when we assimilate interpretations—when we build and refine our mental
models. But there’s no reason to think that that necessarily requires the
same representations or mechanisms as are used in creating the interpreta-
tion. On the contrary, it’s now clear that the mind uses many different kinds
of representations and mechanisms. And, of course, to the extent that us-
ing natural language and representing and reasoning about knowledge are
both cognitive activities, there’s no reason to think that they are charac-
terized by any AI-style formalizations—and plenty of reasons to think that
they aren’t, as Lakoff and Nu´n˜ez (1997, p. 22–23) have argued.
6 Context as a spurious concept
So far, I’ve argued that the notion of ‘context’ can be defined only in terms
of its effects in a particular situation. Just as a stressor is anything that
stresses, one way or another, in at least one situation, context is something
that constrains, one way or another, in at least one situation. In the case of
natural language, many different kinds of things can be elements of con-
text. Context in natural language is constructed, in part, by the speaker and
the interpreter—it’s not the same as context in KR.
In this light, ‘context’ simpliciter can be seen to come dangerously close
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to being a spurious or incoherent concept in much the same way that ‘abso-
lute motion’ is a spurious concept (Peacocke 1992). In fact, there are quite
a number of parallels between the two. In both cases, we have an intu-
ition about the putative concept, and a very robust intuition at that. In our
daily lives, we use what seems to be the notion of absolute motion in our
navigation and moving around, and, as high-school science teachers know,
it’s not an easy notion to break away from. For obvious cognitive reasons,
it’s a psychologically compelling idea. We only need to look at the history
of science to see how reluctantly it was given up, even by highly educated
people. Yet now, a hundred years after theMichaelson–Morley experiment,
it seems so obvious that ‘absolute motion’ is an incoherent or spurious con-
cept that it’s hard to imagine how people ever thought otherwise.
Likewise, we use what seems to be a general notion of context when we
build our interpretations of everything in our daily lives; but this is noth-
ing more than an illusion that arises from our inability to examine our own
mental processes of reasoning and language interpretation. MatthewDryer
(1997) has recently shown that the idea of sentence topic in linguistics,
which has long been thought to be an intuitively well-founded concept,
is in fact a chimera—what Dryer calls a “metalinguistic illusion”. Dryer
has shown that just because a sentence is about something, it doesn’t fol-
low that there’s any constituent in the sentence that’s what the sentence
is about. All there is is discourse topic, even if the discourse is just a sin-
gle sentence. ‘Context’ simpliciter might turn out to be like this—seemingly
intuitively well-founded, but revealed as a chimera upon deeper analysis.
And both absolute motion and context simpliciter are easy to formalize.
Cartesian coordinates work quite nicely for the former in simple everyday
applications. For the latter, McCarthy and Buvacˇ’s (1997) formalization of
context simpliciter can, under certain assumptions, find the price of airplane
parts and disambiguate two homonymous senses of the word bank (Buvacˇ
1996). But however useful they are in local human day-to-day navigation,
Cartesian coordinates are not a very useful formalization for what is now
known about the nature of space and time in theoretical physics. And sim-
ple formalizations of context simpliciter might work on toy examples, but
there’s no reason to expect them to apply to real-world natural language.
On the contrary, a little analysis of what ‘context’ actually is suggests that
they won’t.
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7 Conclusion
I think that AI in general is sometimes just a bit too impetuous in its de-
sire to formalize things, and it tries to turn things into systems or logics
without fully understanding them, as if simply by doing so they would
thereby come to be understood. Sometimes this works; and sometimes it
just leads to meaningless, ungrounded formal systems—Lakoff and Nu´n˜ez
(1997) again. To someone with a hammer, every screw looks like a nail.
And topics that deal with language, cognition, and acting in and interpret-
ing the world get more than their share of this bad treatment.
This seems to arise from a combination of overenthusiasm for Western
scientific method and a misunderstanding of the nature of language that
borders on fear. In this view, language is a messy and highly imperfect
medium that is not to be trusted, but rather must either be sidestepped en-
tirely or be beaten into submission bymeans of logic and formalism. This is
pretty explicit in the work of Frege and Bertrand Russell (1918, p. 205), for
example. Maybe that’s why Russell looked up to Wittgenstein. Wittgen-
stein had the guts (and the brains) to engage the difficult questions of lan-
guage that Russell avoided, and to find some frightening answers—that
some concepts can’t be defined by necessary and sufficient conditions, for
example. That leads to my second observation about AI and Wittgenstein:
All AI knows how to do is carry on as if Wittgenstein had never
existed.
Nor Heidegger and Gadamer; nor Donald Levine; nor Sperber andWilson;
nor George Lakoff; nor Herb Clark; nor Harvey Sacks and Emanuel Sche-
gloff and Harold Garfinkel and Erving Goffman. And I carry on that way
too, at times—but at least I feel guilty about it.
So in this talk, I’ve been rather negative and pessimistic in places, and
I don’t want to close on that kind of a note. After all, one thing that the
field of artificial intelligence has certainly succeeded in over the years is
expressions of unbounded optimism. So I want to close by emphasizing
that we do have a good chance of getting a handle on ‘context’—but we
need to avoid premature, uninformed formalization. Situation theory (De-
vlin 1991) seems to me to be one especially good candidate. There is a
strong intuitive relationship between the ideas of ‘context’ and ‘situation’;
situation theory has been under development for many years; and compu-
tational and linguistic concerns have been there from the start (Barwise and
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Perry 1983). It is heartening to see books such as that of Devlin and Rosen-
berg (1996), who apply situation theory to real language in use and who
say in their preface that their greatest intellectual debt is to Harvey Sacks.
So I think that work on formalizing context that uses situation theory, such
as that by Akman and Surav (1996, 1997) and Ferrari (1997), is pointing
us in the right general direction. There are also many other promising ap-
proaches to context—I can’t possibly mention all the names—and I’m look-
ing forward to hearing about some of them in this symposium.
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